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Executive Summary

Computational
propaganda – the
use of algorithms,
automation, and big
data to shape public
life – is becoming
a pervasive and
ubiquitous part of
everyday life.

Over the past three years, we have monitored the
global organization of social media manipulation by
governments and political parties. Our 2019 report
analyses the trends of computational propaganda
and the evolving tools, capacities, strategies, and
resources.

1. Evidence of organized social media manipulation

campaigns which have taken place in 70 countries,
up from 48 countries in 2018 and 28 countries in
2017. In each country, there is at least one political
party or government agency using social media to
shape public attitudes domestically (Figure 1).

2. Social

media has become co-opted by many
authoritarian regimes. In 26 countries,
computational propaganda is being used as
a tool of information control in three distinct
ways: to suppress fundamental human rights,
discredit political opponents, and drown out
dissenting opinions (Figure 2).

3. A

handful of sophisticated state actors use
computational propaganda for foreign influence
operations. Facebook and Twitter attributed
foreign influence operations to seven countries
(China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
and Venezuela) who have used these platforms to
influence global audiences (Figure 3).

4. China

has become a major player in the global
disinformation order. Until the 2019 protests in Hong
Kong, most evidence of Chinese computational
propaganda occurred on domestic platforms such
as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. But China’s new-found
interest in aggressively using Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube should raise concerns for democracies

5. Despite

there being more social networking
platforms than ever, Facebook remains the
platform of choice for social media manipulation.
In 56 countries, we found evidence of formally
organized computational propaganda campaigns
on Facebook. (Figure 4).

[ i ]

2019 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANISED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION

Contents

1
7
9
11
17
21
22
23
23

Introduction
Report Methodology
Organisational Form
Strategies, Tools, and Techniques
Organisational Budgets, Behaviours, and Capacity
Conclusion
References
Acknowledgements
Authors Biographies

ILLUSTRATIONS

3
5

Figure 1 - The Global Disinformation Order
Figure 2 - Computational Propaganda as a Tool of Information
Control

5
6
10

Figure 3 - Foreign Influence Operations on Social Media
Figure 4 - Prominent Platforms for Social Media Manipulation
Table 1 - Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media
Manipulation

12
14
16
18

Table 2 - Fake Account Types
Table 3 - Messaging and Valence
Table 4 - Communication Strategies
Table 5 - Cyber Troop Capacity

This report can be cited as: Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard. (2019) The Global Disinformation Disorder: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Working Paper
2019.2. Oxford, UK: Project on Computational Propaganda.

[ ii ]

2019 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANISED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION

Introduction

Around the world,
government
actors are using
social media to
manufacture
consensus,
automate
suppression,
and undermine
trust in the liberal
international order.

Although propaganda has always been a part of political
discourse, the deep and wide-ranging scope of these campaigns
raise critical public interest concerns.
Cyber troops’ are defined as government or political party
actors tasked with manipulating public opinion online
(Bradshaw and Howard 2017a). We comparatively examine
the formal organization of cyber troops around the world, and
how these actors use computational propaganda for political
purposes. This involves building an inventory of the evolving
strategies, tools, and techniques of computational propaganda,
including the use of ‘political bots’ to amplify hate speech or
other forms of manipulated content, the illegal harvesting of
data or micro-targeting, or deploying an army of ‘trolls’ to bully
or harass political dissidents or journalists online. We also track
the capacity and resources invested into developing these
techniques to build a picture of cyber troop capabilities around
the world.
The use of computational propaganda to shape public attitudes
via social media has become mainstream, extending far beyond
the actions of a few bad actors. In an information environment
characterized by high volumes of information and limited
levels of user attention and trust, the tools and techniques of
computational propaganda are becoming a common – and
arguably essential – part of digital campaigning and public
diplomacy. In addition to building a globally comparative picture
of cyber troop activity, we also hope to drive public and scholarly
debate about how we define and understand the changing
nature of politics online, and how technologies can and should
be used to enhance democracy and the expression of human
rights online.
In this year’s report, we examine cyber troop activity in 70
countries: Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia,
China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras,
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta,
Mexico, Moldova, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, North Korea,
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi
Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka,
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Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,

70

Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States,
Number of Countries

Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

Growing Evidence of Computational Propaganda
Around the World
We found evidence of organised social media manipulation

48
28
2017

2018

2019

150%
the increase in
countries using
organised social
media manipulation
campaigns over the
last two years

campaigns in 70 countries, up from 48 countries in 2018 and
28 countries in 2017. Some of this growth comes from new
entrants who are experimenting with the tools and techniques

have begun publishing limited information about influence

of computational propaganda during elections or as a new tool

operations on their platforms – have taken action against

of information control. However, journalists, academics, and

cyber troops engaged in foreign influence operations in seven

activists are also better equipped with digital tools and a more

countries: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and

precise vocabulary to identify, report, and uncover instances

Venezuela. Although this measure does not capture the extent

of formally organized social media manipulation. Over the

to which foreign influence operations are taking place, we can

past three years we have been able to refine our language

confidently begin to build a picture of this highly secretive

and search terms for identifying instances of computational

phenomenon.

propaganda, and we found that many countries have displayed
elements of formally organized social media manipulation for
the past decade. As a result, we suggest that computational

China Flexes its Misinformation Muscle

propaganda has become a ubiquitous and pervasive part of the

Until recently, we found that China rarely used social media to

digital information ecosystem.

manipulate public opinion in other countries. The audience for
computational propaganda has mainly focused on domestic

The Co-Option of Social Media in Authoritarian
Regimes

platforms, such as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. However, in 2019
the Chinese government began to employ global social media

In many authoritarian regimes, computational propaganda

platforms to paint Hong Kong’s democracy advocates as

has become a tool of information control that is strategically

violent radicals with no popular appeal (Lee Myers and Mozur

used in combination with surveillance, censorship, and threats

2019). Beyond domestically bound platforms, the growing

of violence. We have catalogued the kinds of campaigns

sophistication and use of global social networking technologies

authoritarian countries have used against journalists, political

demonstrates how China is also turning to these technologies

dissidents, and the broader society, and found three distinct

as a tool of geopolitical power and influence.

ways in which computational propaganda is used:
(1) to suppress fundamental human rights;

Facebook is Still Number One

(2) to discredit political opposition; and

Despite there being more platforms than ever, Facebook

(3) to drown out political dissent.

of the reason for this could be explained by its market size –

remains the dominant platform for cyber troop activity. Part
as one of the world’s largest social networking platforms – as

The co-option of social media technologies provides authoritarian

well as the specific affordances of the platform, such as close

regimes with a powerful tool to shape public discussions and

family and friend communication, a source of political news

spread propaganda online, while simultaneously surveilling,

and information, or the ability to form groups and pages. Since

censoring, and restricting digital public spaces.

2018, we have collected evidence of more cyber troop activity
on image- and video-sharing platforms such as Instagram and

A Limited Number of Foreign Influence 		
Operations by Highly Sophisticated Actors

YouTube. We have also collected evidence of cyber troops
running campaigns on WhatsApp. We think these platforms

Foreign influence operations are an important area of concern

will grow in importance over the next few years as more

but attributing computational propaganda to foreign state

people use these social networking technologies for political

actors remains a challenge. Facebook and Twitter – who

communication.

[ 2 ]

2019 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANISED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION

2019 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANISED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION

FIGURE 1 - THE GLOBAL DISINFORMATION ORDER
COUNTRIES TAKING PART IN SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION
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FIGURE 2 - COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA AS A TOOL OF INFORMATION CONTROL
AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES DEPLOYING COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
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FIGURE 3 - FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
COUNTRIES ATTRIBUTED BY FACEBOOK AND TWITTER FOR ENGAGING IN FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS
China

Venezuela

India

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Russia

Pakistan

Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: Facebook has also taken down accounts engaged in 'coordinated inauthentic behaviour' that are not
explicitly linked to a government or political party. These takedowns include accounts originating from: Egypt, Macedonia, Kosovo, Thailand, and the United Arab
Emirates. Additionally, some cyber troop activity identified by Facebook and Twitter is domestically focused, such as in the case of Bangladesh and Honduras, and is
therefore not included in this figure on foreign operations.
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FIGURE 4 - PROMINENT PLATFORMS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS USED FOR CYBER TROOP ACTIVITY
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Report Methodology

The methodology for
this report consists of
four stages:

nt Analy
sis
nte
Co

L

2. a secondary
literature review of
public archives and
scientific reports;

ature Rev
ie
rar
e
it

w

1. a systematic content
analysis of news
articles reporting on
cyber troop activity;

se Studies
Ca

3. drafting country
case studies; and
E
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For the past three years, our three-stage methodology has

Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. We also

allowed us to successfully capture a wide range of public

worked with BBC monitoring1 who provided an additional portal

documents that shed light on the organized manipulation

for collecting and aggregating high-quality news and information

campaigns globally. There are almost certainly cyber troop

on cyber troop activity, as well as translation services for news

operations that have not been publicly documented, and we

articles for Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

have already seen these cases grow over time. While this report

Malaysia, North Macedonia, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

in no way is intended to provide a complete picture of how state

Uzbekistan. We relied on English-language-only reporting for:

actors are operating in this space, we can begin to build a bigger

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Czech Republic, Eritrea,

picture by piecing together public information. The country-

Ethiopia, Hungary, Israel, Moldova, Myanmar, Netherlands,

specific profiles and a full list of news items and secondary

North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Serbia, South Korea, Sri

literature sources can be found on the 2019 report homepage.

Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.

Content analysis is an established research method in

After conducting a content analysis, a team of research

communication and media studies (Herring 2009). It has been

assistants completed a secondary literature review to provide

used to help understand how the Internet and social media

an in-depth profile of cyber troop activity in a specific country

interact with political action, regime transformation, and

context. These case studies drew from the data collected in

digital control (Bradshaw and Howard 2018a, 2017b; Edwards,

the content analysis, as well as an in-depth secondary literature

Howard, and Joyce 2013; Joyce, Antonio, and Howard 2013;

review, where case study authors searched for other high-

Strange et al. 2013). This qualitative content analysis was

quality open source information about cyber troop activity. This

conducted to understand the range of state actors who actively

involved looking for government reports, think tank papers,

use social media to manipulate public opinion, as well as their

academic and scholarly studies, and research conducted by

capacity, strategies, and resources. We modelled our content

civil society organizations. A complete archive of the news

analysis after last year’s report, using purposive sampling to

sources and secondary literature used in this report can be

build a coded spreadsheet of specific variables that appear

found in an online Zotero database. We hope this public library

in news articles. The following keywords were selected and

will help inform future research.

used in combination for our search: bot; Cambridge Analytica;

After completing a qualitative content analysis and secondary

disinformation; Facebook; fake account; information warfare;

literature review, research assistants synthesized the findings

Instagram; military; misinformation; propaganda; psychological

into short country case studies. The case studies provide more

operations; psyops; social media; sock puppet; troll; Twitter;

information about instances of computational propaganda we

WhatsApp; YouTube.

identified in the content analysis, as well as detailed information

There are two major limitations to conducting our qualitative

about the specific country context and media environment in

content analyses: media bias and language. To help mitigate

which social media manipulations are taking place. In addition

bias, we used LexisNexis and the top three search engine

to the content analysis and secondary literature review, we

providers – Google, Yahoo! and Bing – which provided hits to

completed a case study for 84% of the countries, which can be

a variety of professional, local, and amateur news sources. To

online in a data supplement alongside the report.

ensure that only high-quality news sources were being used to

Finally, the last step of our research methodology –

build our dataset, each article was given a credibility score using

consultations with experts – allowed us to peer review the

a three-point scale. Articles ranked at one came from major,

case studies, as well as get feedback on the quality of English

professionally branded news organizations. Articles ranked at

and local-language news reporting and secondary literature

two came from smaller professional news organizations, local

we found and discuss additional resources and citations in

news organizations, or expert commentary and professional

alternative languages with native speakers. Experts were asked

blogs. Articles ranked at three came from content farms, or

to review the case studies drafted by research assistants, and

personal or hyper-partisan blogs. These articles were removed

(1) fact-check the information and data for accuracy; (2) provide

from the sample.

additional citations to open source material; and (3) provide

Language was a second limitation to conducting our qualitative

general feedback on the reliability of the data. In the cases of

content analysis. For this year’s global inventory, we were able

Poland, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tunisia, and Ukraine, we consulted

to draw upon news articles and secondary resources written

experts on the data collected from the content analysis and

in Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian,

literature review.

1

https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/
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Organisational Form

Cyber troop activity takes
on many organizational
forms and diverse actors
are leveraging social media
to shape public opinion,
set political agendas, and
propagate ideas.

conversations around what are appropriate, democratic and
acceptable uses of these tools by state actors.
In addition to government or military-led initiatives, we also
looked at political parties. In 45 out of the 70 countries we
analysed, we found evidence of political parties or politicians
running for office who have used the tools and techniques of
computational propaganda during elections. Here, we counted
instances of politicians amassing fake followers, such as
Mitt Romney in the United States (Carroll 2012), Tony Abbott
in Australia (Rolfe 2013), or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands
(Blood 2017). We also counted instances of parties using
advertising to target voters with manipulated media, such as
in India (Gleicher 2019), or instances of illegal micro-targeting
such as the use of the firm Cambridge Analytica in the UK Brexit

While many countries have seen an increase in computational

referendum by Vote Leave (Cadwalladr 2017). Finally, we further

propaganda on social media, attribution back to a particular

counted instances of political parties purposively spreading

actor remains difficult.

or amplifying disinformation on social networks, such as the
WhatsApp campaigns in Brazil (Rio 2018), India (Dwoskin and

In this report, we focus specifically on cyber troops –

Gowen 2018), and Nigeria (Hitchen et al. 2019).

or government or political party use of social media to
manipulate public opinion. In 44 countries, we found evidence

One important feature of the organization of manipulation

of a government agency using computational propaganda

campaigns is that cyber troops often work in conjunction with

to shape public attitudes. This category of actors includes

private industry, civil society organizations, Internet subcultures,

communication or digital ministries or military-led campaigns.

youth groups, hacker collectives, fringe movements, social

In countries considered ‘not free' according to Freedom

media influencers, and volunteers who ideologically support

House, we found evidence of a government ministry or ruling

their cause. The distinction between these groups can often

party using computational propaganda to shape attitudes

be difficult to draw, especially since activities can be implicitly

domestically. In a small number of democracies, we found

and explicitly sanctioned by the state. In this report, we look for

evidence of government or military-led initiatives. For this

evidence of formal coordination or activities that are officially

report, we counted the activities of the Joint Threat Research

sanctioned by the state, rather than campaigns that might be

Intelligence Group (JTRIG) in the United Kingdom, who set

implicitly sanctioned because of factors such as overlapping

up Facebook groups and created YouTube videos containing

ideologies or goals. In 25 out of the 70 countries we found

persuasive communications designed to “discredit, promote

evidence of state actors working with private companies

distrust, dissuade, deter, delay [and] disrupt” (Greenwald

or strategic communication firms who offer computational

2015). We also counted activities in the United States, such

propaganda as a service. In 30 out of the 70 countries, we

as the United States Agency for International Development

found evidence of formal coordination between governments

(USAID) programme that created a fake social network in Cuba

and citizens or civil society organizations. In some cases, like

(Greenwald 2014). As computational propaganda becomes an

in Azerbaijan, Israel, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, student

increasingly ubiquitous tool for politics, national security, and

or youth groups are hired by government agencies to use

intelligence operations, we hope these examples drive further

computational propaganda.
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TABLE 1 - ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION

Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the types of political actors using social media influence operations, and the number of examples of those
organizations found. For government agencies, political parties, civil society groups, and private contractors, ■ = one organization found, ■ = two organizations found, ■ = three or more
organizations found. Since it is difficult to assess the number of individual citizens using these tools, evidence of citizen use is indicated by ■.
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Strategies, Tools, and
Techniques
Although there is
nothing necessarily new
about propaganda, the
affordances of social
networking technologies
– algorithms, automation,
and big data – change the
scale, scope, and precision
of how information is
transmitted in the 		
digital age.

Account Types
Fake accounts are used by cyber troops to spread computational
propaganda. Over the past three years we have tracked the
prevalence of three types of fake accounts: bot, human, and
cyborg. Bots are highly automated accounts designed to
mimic human behaviour online. They are often used to amplify
narratives or drown out political dissent. We found evidence of
bot accounts being used in 50 of the 70 countries. However,
even more common than bots are human-run accounts,
which do not make use of automation. Instead they engage in
conversations by posting comments or tweets, or by private
messaging individuals via social media platforms. Humanoperated accounts were found in 60 out of the 70 countries in
this year’s report. Cyborg accounts, which blend automation
with human curation, are another account type we identified.
This year, we have added hacked or stolen accounts to our
typology of fake accounts. Although these accounts are not
‘fake’ per se, high profile accounts are strategically used by
cyber troops in order to spread pro-government propaganda
or to censor freedom of speech by revoking access to the

87%
of countries used
Human accounts

80%
of countries used

account by its rightful owner. A small number of state actors
have begun using stolen or hacked accounts as part of their
campaigns, highlighting the interconnectivity of computational
propaganda with more traditional forms of cyber-attacks.
Finally, it is important to note that not all accounts used in cyber
troop activities are fake. In some countries, like Vietnam or
Tajikistan, state actors encourage cyber troops to use their real
accounts to spread pro-government propaganda, troll political

Bot accounts

dissidents, or mass-report content. As social media companies

11%
of countries used

with cyber troop activity, the co-option of real accounts could

become more aggressive in taking down accounts associated
become a more prominent strategy.

Cyborg accounts

7%
of countries used

Hacked or Stolen
accounts
[ 11 ]
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TABLE 2 - FAKE ACCOUNT TYPES
Country

Bots

Human

Cyborg

Country

Hacked or
Stolen

Angola

Malta

Argentina

Mexico

Armenia

Moldova

Australia

Myanmar

Austria

Netherlands

Azerbaijan

Nigeria

Bahrain

North Korea

Bosnia &
Herzegovina

Pakistan

Bots

Human

Cyborg

Hacked or
Stolen

Philippines

Brazil

Poland

Cambodia

Qatar

China

Russia

Colombia

Rwanda

Croatia

Saudi Arabia

Cuba

Serbia

Czech
Republic

South Africa

Ecuador

South Korea

Egypt

Spain

Eritrea

Sri Lanka

Ethiopia

Sudan

Georgia

Sweden

Germany

Syria

Greece

Taiwan

Guatemala

Tajikistan

Honduras

Thailand

Hungary

Tunisia

India

Turkey

Indonesia

Ukraine

Iran

United Arab
Emirates

Israel
Italy

United
Kingdom

Kazakhstan

United
States

Kenya

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Venezuela

Macedonia

Vietnam

Malaysia

Zimbabwe

Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the types of fake accounts identified between 2010-2019. For fake social media account types:
accounts,
= human accounts,
= cyborg accounts,
= Hacked or Stolen accounts,
= no evidence found.
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71%
spread pro-government or pro-party
propaganda

89%
use computational

Messaging and Valence
Cyber troops use a variety of messaging and valence strategies
when communicating with users online. Valence describes
how attractive or unattractive a message, event, or thing is. For
the 2019 report, we have expanded our typology of messaging
and valence strategies that cyber troops use when engaging in
conversations with users online:
(1) spreading pro-government or pro-party propaganda;

propaganda to
attack political
opposition

(2) attacking the opposition or mounting smear campaigns;

34%
spread polarising

(4) driving division and polarization; and

messages designed
to drive divisions
within society

(3) distracting or diverting conversations or criticism away from
important issues;

(5) suppressing participation through personal attacks or
harassment.
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TABLE 3 - MESSAGING AND VALENCE

Philippines

Brazil

Poland

Cambodia

Qatar

China

Russia

Colombia

Rwanda

Croatia

Saudi Arabia

Cuba

Serbia

Czech
Republic

South Africa

Ecuador

South Korea

Egypt

Spain
Sri Lanka

Eritrea

Sudan

Ethiopia

Sweden

Georgia

Syria

Germany

Taiwan

Greece

Tajikistan

Guatemala

Thailand

Honduras

Tunisia

Hungary

Turkey

India

Ukraine

Indonesia

United Arab
Emirates

Iran
Israel

United
Kingdom

Italy
Kazakhstan

United
States

Kenya

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Venezuela

Macedonia

Vietnam

Malaysia

Zimbabwe

Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the types of messaging and valence strategies of cyber troop activity between 2010-2019. For social media
comments:
= supporting,
= attack opposition,
= distracting,
= driving division,
= suppressing.
= no evidence found.
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75%
of countries used

disinformation
and media
manipulation to mislead users

68%

of countries use
state-sponsored
trolling to target
political dissidents,
the opposition or
journalists

73%
amplify messages

and content by
flooding hashtags

Communication Strategies
Cyber troops use a variety of communication strategies. We
have categorized these activities into four categories:
(1) the creation of disinformation or manipulated media;
(2) mass-reporting of content or accounts;
(3) data-driven strategies;
(4) trolling, doxing or harassment;
(5) amplifying content and media online.
The creation of disinformation or manipulated media is the most
common communication strategy. In 52 out of the 70 countries
we examined, cyber troops actively created content such as
memes, videos, fake news websites or manipulated media in
order to mislead users. Sometimes, the content created by
cyber troops is targeted at specific communities or segments
of users. By using online and offline sources of data about
users, and paying for advertisements on popular social media
platforms, some cyber troops target specific communities with
disinformation or manipulated media.
The use of trolling, doxing or harassment is a growing global
challenge and threat to fundamental human rights. In 2018,
we identified 27 countries that used state-sponsored trolls to
attack political opponents or activists via social media. This
year, 47 countries have used trolling as part of their digital
arsenal. Cyber troops also censor speech and expression
through the mass-reporting of content or accounts. Posts by
activists, political dissidents or journalists often get reported
by a coordinated network of cyber troop accounts in order to
game the automated systems social media companies use to
take down inappropriate content. Trolling and the takedown of
accounts or posts can happen alongside real-world violence,
which can have a deep and chilling effect on the expression of
fundamental human rights.
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TABLE 4 - COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

Philippines

Brazil

Poland

Cambodia

Qatar

China

Russia

Colombia

Rwanda

Croatia

Saudi Arabia

Cuba

Serbia

Czech
Republic

South Africa

Ecuador

South Korea

Egypt

Spain

Eritrea

Sri Lanka

Ethiopia

Sudan

Georgia

Sweden

Germany

Syria

Greece

Taiwan

Guatemala

Tajikistan

Honduras

Thailand

Hungary

Tunisia

India

Turkey

Indonesia

Ukraine

Iran

United Arab
Emirates

Israel

United
Kingdom

Italy
Kazakhstan

United
States

Kenya

Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

Venezuela

Macedonia

Vietnam

Malaysia

Zimbabwe

Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the communication strategies used by cyber troops. For communication strategies:
= Disinformation and
Manipulated Media,
= Mass Reporting of Content/Accounts,
= Data-Driven Strategies,
= Trolling,
= Amplifying Content,
= no evidence found.
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Organisational Budgets,
Behaviours, and Capacity
Although there
is limited public
information about the
size and operations
of cyber troop teams,
we can begin to
assemble a picture
of how much money
they budget, how they
cooperate, and the
kinds of organizational
capacities and
behaviours they
assume.

Team Size and Permanency
The size and permanency of teams vary from country to country.
In some countries, teams appear temporarily around elections
or to shape public attitudes around other important political
events. In others, cyber troops are integrated into the media
and communication landscape with full-time staff working
to control, censor, and shape conversations and information
online. Some teams are comprised of a handful of people who
manage hundreds of fake accounts. In other countries – like
China, Vietnam or Venezuela – large teams of people are hired
by the state to actively shape public opinions and police speech
through online channels

Budgets and Expenditures
Computational propaganda remains big business. We found
large amounts of money being spent on ‘PR’ or strategic
communication firms to work on campaigns in countries such
as the Philippines (Mahtani and Cabato 2019), Guatemala
(Currier and Mackey 2018), and Syria (York 2011). These
contracts can range in size from smaller spends with boutique
national or regional firms, to multi-million-dollar contracts with
global companies like Cambridge Analytica (see, for example,
Kazeem 2018). The rise of the troll industry is a growing area
of public and academic interest, and an area to watch for future
research and journalistic inquiry.

Skills and Knowledge Diffusion
There is also evidence of formal and informal knowledge
diffusion happening across geographic lines. For example,
during the investigations into cyber troop activity in Myanmar,
evidence emerged that military officials were trained by Russian
operatives on how to use social media (Mozur 2018). Similarly,
cyber troops in Sri Lanka received formal training in India (Expert
consultation 2019). Leaked emails also showed evidence of the
Information Network Agency in Ethiopia sending staff members
to receive formal training in China (Nunu 2018). While there
are many gaps in how knowledge and skills in computational
propaganda are diffusing globally, this is also an important area
to watch for future research and journalistic inquiry. .
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Cyber Troop Capacity

election cycle. Low capacity teams tend to experiment with only

By looking comparatively across the behaviours, expenditures,
tools, and resources cyber troop employ, we can begin to build
a larger comparative picture of the global organization of social
media manipulation. National contexts are always important
to consider. However, we suggest it is also worth generalizing
about the experience of organized disinformation campaigns

a few strategies, such as using bots to amplify disinformation.
These teams operate domestically, with no operations abroad.
Low capacity teams include: Austria, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Eritrea, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya,
Macedonia, Moldova, Nigeria, North Korea, Poland, Rwanda,
Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Zimbabwe.

across regime types to develop a broad and comparative

(3) Medium cyber troop capacity involves teams that have

understanding of this phenomenon. We have begun to develop

a much more consistent form and strategy, involving full-

a simplistic measure to comparatively assess the capacity

time staff members who are employed year-round to control

of cyber troop teams in relation to one another, taking into

the information space. These medium-capacity teams often

consideration the number of government actors involved, the

coordinate with multiple actor types, and experiment with a wide

sophistication of tools, the number of campaigns, the size and

variety of tools and strategies for social media manipulation.

permanency of teams, and budgets or expenditures made. We

Some medium-capacity teams conduct influence operations

describe cyber troop capacity on a four-point scale:

abroad. Medium-capacity teams include: Azerbaijan, Bahrain,

(1) Minimal cyber troop teams are newly formed or teams
that were previously active but whose present activities are
uncertain. Newly formed teams have minimal resources and
only apply a few tools of computational propaganda to a small

Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia,
Georgia, Guatemala, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia,
Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan.

number of platforms. Minimal cyber troop activity also includes

(4) High cyber troop capacity involves large numbers of staff,

states where we have seen only one or two politicians who

and large budgetary expenditure on psychological operations

experiment with computational propaganda tools. These teams

or information warfare. There might also be significant funds

operate domestically, with no operations abroad. Minimal

spent on research and development, as well as evidence of a

teams include: Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Croatia,

multitude of techniques being used. These teams do not only

Ecuador, Greece, Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan

operate during elections but involve full-time staff dedicated

and Tunisia.

to shaping the information space. High-capacity cyber troop

(2) Low cyber troop capacity involves small teams that may be
active during elections or referenda but stop activity until the next

teams focus on foreign and domestic operations. High-capacity
teams include: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, and
the United States.

TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY
HIGH CAPACITY
Country

Status

Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending

China

Permanent

Team size estimates of 300,000-2,000,000 people working in local and regional offices

Egypt

Permanent

–

Iran

Permanent

6,000 USD spent on FB advertisements

Israel

Permanent

Team size estimates of 400 people. Evidence of Formal Training. Multiple contracts valued at 778K
USD and 100M USD.

Myanmar

Permanent

Evidence of Formal Training in Russia

Russia

Permanent

–

Saudi Arabia

Permanent

Estimated costs of 150 Pounds for Twitter Hashtag Trends

Syria

Permanent

Multiple Contracts valued at 4,000 USD

United Arab
Emirates

Permanent

Multiple Expenditures valued at over 10M USD

United States

Permanent &
Temporary

–

Venezuela

Permanent

Team size estimates of multiple brigades of 500 people. Evidence of Formal Training

Vietnam

Permanent &
Temporary

Team size estimates of 10,000 people
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TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY continued
MEDIUM CAPACITY
Country

Status

Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending

Azerbaijan

Permanent

–

Bahrain

Permanent

Multiple contracts with estimates valued at 32M USD

Bosnia &
Herzegovina

Temporary

Brazil

Temporary

Multiple contracts valued at 10M R, 130K R, 24K R, 12M R

Cambodia

Permanent &
Temporary

–

Cuba

Permanent

–

Ethiopia

Permanent

Evidence of Training in China. Estimated salaries of 300 USD/mont

Georgia

Temporary

–

Guatemala

Permanent

Multiple contracts valued at 100,000 USD

India

Temporary

Multiple teams ranging in size from 50-300 people. Multiple contracts and advertising expenditures
valued at over 1.4M USD

Kazakhstan

Temporary

–

Kyrgyzstan

Permanent &
Temporary

Team size estimates of 50 people. Multiple contracts valued at 2000 USD. Salaries are estimated to
be 3-4 USD/day

Malaysia

Permanent

Staff estimates between 50-2000 people. Evidence of formal training found

Malta

Permanent

–

Mexico

Temporary

–

Pakistan

Permanent

–

Philippines

Permanent

300-500

Qatar

Temporary

–

Sri Lanka

Permanent &
Temporary

Evidence of Formal Training in India

Sudan

Permanent

–

Tajikistan

Permanent

Team size estimates of 400 people

Thailand

Permanent

Evidence of Formal Training

Turkey

Permanent

Team size estimates of 500 people

Ukraine

Permanent

Team size estimates of 20,000 people

United
Kingdom

Temporary

3.5M GBP spent on Cambridge Analytica by Leave Campaigns

Uzbekistan

Permanent

–

–
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TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY continued
LOW CAPACITY
Country

Status

Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending

Austria

Temporary

–

Colombia

Temporary

–

Czech Republic

Temporary

–

Eritrea

Permanent

–

Germany

Temporary

–

Honduras

Temporary

–

Hungary

Temporary

–

Indonesia

Temporary

Multiple contracts valued between 1M-50M Rupias

Italy

Temporary

–

Kenya

Temporary

One contract with Cambridge Analytica valued at 6M USD

Macedonia

Temporary

–

Moldova

Temporary

20,000USD spent on Facebook and Instagram Ads

Nigeria

Temporary

One contract with Cambridge Analytica Valued at 2.8M USD

North Korea

Permanent

Team size estimates of 200 people

Poland

Temporary

–

Rwanda

Temporary

–

Serbia

Permanent

Salary Estimates valued at 370 EURO/month

South Africa

Temporary

Multiple contracts valued at 2M USD

Spain

Temporary

–

Zimbabwe

Temporary

–

Country

Status

Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending

Angola

Temporary

–

Argentina

Temporary

30-40 Staff. Multiple Contracts valued at 14M Pesos, 11M Pesos in 2015. 200M Pesos in 2017

Armenia

Temporary

–

Australia

Temporary

–

Croatia

Temporary

–

Ecuador

No Longer Active

Multiple contracts valued at 200,000 USD

Greece

Temporary

–

Netherlands

Temporary

–

South Korea

No Longer Active

Previously active team of less than 20 people

Sweden

Temporary

–

Taiwan

No Longer Active

–

Tunisia

Temporary

–

MINIMAL CAPACITY

Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: These tables reports on the capacity of cyber troop actors.

[ 20 ]

2019 GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANISED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION

Conclusion

Social media, which
was once heralded as
a force for freedom
and democracy,
has come under
increasing scrutiny for
its role in amplifying
disinformation, inciting
violence, and lowering
levels of trust in
media and democratic
institutions.

This report has highlighted the ways in which government
agencies and political parties have used social media to spread
political propaganda, pollute the digital information ecosystem,
and suppress freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
While the affordances of social media can serve to enhance the
scale, scope, and precision of disinformation (Bradshaw and
Howard 2018b), it is important to recognize that many of the
issues at the heart of computational propaganda – polarization,
distrust or the decline of democracy – have existed long before
social media and even the Internet itself. The co-option of social
media technologies should cause concern for democracies
around the world – but so should many of the long-standing
challenges facing democratic societies.
Computational propaganda has become a normal part of the
digital public sphere. These techniques will also continue to
evolve as new technologies – including Artificial Intelligence,
Virtual Reality, or the Internet of Things – are poised to
fundamentally reshape society and politics. But since
computational propaganda is a symptom of long-standing
challenges to democracy, it is important that solutions take into
consideration these systemic challenges. However, it must also
consider the role social media platforms have played in shaping
the current information environment. A strong democracy
requires access to high-quality information and an ability
for citizens to come together to debate, discuss, deliberate,
empathize, and make concessions. Are social media platforms
really creating a space for public deliberation and democracy?
Or are they amplifying content that keeps citizens addicted,
disinformed, and angry?
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